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MAKING SENSE OF RULES IOb-5 AND 14e-3 
by 
Susan Lorde Martin* 
I. Introduction 
Npw that the eighties are gone and Michael 
Mil ken and Ivan Boesky and other high profile securities 
traders have served tlme in jail, the relative calm in Wall 
Street "wheeling and dealing" presents a wonderful 
for Congress to finally clarify insider trading law. 
Al thougp the newspapers have been full of insider trading 
stories and numbers of highly publifized insider trading 
cases have come before the courts, Congress has never 
clarified what insider trading is and what specific behavior 
should be prohibited. Leaving these "details" to the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the courts has 
resulted in wrangling between the former and the latter and in 
a body of law that does not make much sense. 
·This article will first discuss the Congressional purpose 
and methods for prohibiting insider trading. Then, SEC Rules 
lOb-5 and 14e-3 will be explained and compared. The 
comparison will show that the statutes authorizing the SEC to 
promulgate those rules are not identical and, therefore, the 
letter of the law does not require those rules to be 
interpreted identically. Nevertheless, there is no policy 
reason to have rules prohibiting insider trading vary 
depending on whether or not the securities being traded are 
the subject of a tender offer. Therefore, this article 
concludes that Congress, in order to create coherent insider 
trading law, should explicitly indicate which of the two rules 
has been properly interpreted by the courts. Application of 
the rules is difficult enough without having the additional 
burden of incongruous policy. 
II. Prohibiting Insider Trading 
Congress has made clear its intention to stop insider 
trading as well as other market practices it considers abusive 
in order to maintain confidence in the fairness of the 
securities markets. The stock market crash 
*Assistant Professor of Business Law, Hofstra University 
School of Business 
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of October 1,9, 1987. magnified importance1 of encouraging public conf1dence 1n the secur1 ty markets. That event, 
together witj the dramatic increase in insider trading cases 
in the 1980's and a public perception that inside traders are 
not caught, 9 Congress intent on doing battle against 
insider trading. 
PecHliarly, although legislating against insider 
trading, Congress has purposefu1fY declined to. define 
statutorily what insider trading is. The House Comm1ttee on 
Energy and Commerce has defined insider trading as "trading in 
the securities markets while in possession of • material' 
information (generally, information that would be important to 
an investor in making a decision to buy .or Jfll a sec':'ri ty) 
that is not available to the general publ1c. The rat1onale 
for refusing to enact into law this or any other definition is 
to avoid restricting the reach of securities laws and to avoid 
facilhtating schemes designed to circumvent the intent of the 
laws. Using general antifraud provisions rather than a 
specific definition has, as noted approvingly by the House 
Committee, permitted courts to construe the 
broadly anft the SEC to use its rulemaking author1ty 
creatively. Moreover, according to the House Committee, 
court decisions and SEC actions h1fe sufficiently clarified 
principles of insider trading law. 
Unfortunately, since that House Committee report in 1984, 
the law has become more confusing rather than more lucid. 
This is particularly so because a recent opinion of the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit interpreting 
Rule 14e-311 is at odds with the United States Supreme Court's 
interpretations of Rule lOb-5 • 18 
III. Rule lOb-5 
Section lO(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 19 
provides, in pertinent part, that 
[i]t shall be unlawful for any person ... 
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the 
purchase or sale of any security registered on a 
national securities exchange or any security not so 
registered, any manipulative or deceptive device or 
contrivance in contravention of such rules and 
regulations as the Commission may prescribe as 
necessary or appropriate in public interest or for 
the protection of investors. 
Pursuflnt to that section the SEC promulgated Rule 
lOb-5 which provides, in pertinent part, that 
[i]t shall be unlawful for any person ... 
(a) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to 
defraud, ... 
(c) to engage in any act, practice or course of 
business which operates ... as a fraud or deceit upon 
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any person, ifl connection with the purchase or sale of 
any security. 
Although nowhere specifically prohibiting insider 
trading, these general antifraud provisions have been the 
primary bases for lawsuits against those who have bought or 
sold securities while in of material, nonpublic 
information about those securities. 3 Because Congress has 
declined to be specific about the prohibitions on insider 
trading, it has been left to the SEC and courts to determine 
what fraud means in this context. 
The SEC determined in re Cady, Roberts & Co. 24 that the 
common law imposes on corporate officers, directors, other 
insiders, and "tippees" who are privy to the same information 
';'s insi?ers, a duty to disclose material, nonpubli.c 
1nformat1on before trading in their company's 
The United States Supreme Court has also looked to the common 
law .definition of fraud and used it in interpreting 
Sect1ofi lO(b) and Rule lOb-5. In Chiarella v. United 
States the Court held that one who trades in securities 
using material, nonpublic information is committing fraud and 
violating Rule lOb-5, only if he or she has a duty to 
the information and such a dutY. arises only from a 
relationship of trust and confidence. 28 Thus, traders have no 
obligation to reveal material facts to those with whom they 
they are neither insiders nor 
f1duc1ar1es. Accord1ng to the Court, silence cannot be 
fraudulent absent a duty to di,flose and duties arise only 
from some special relationship. 
Chiarella, who was employed by a financial printer, was 
able deduce from documents he handled at work, the names of 
companies that were the targets of corporate takeovers.3l 
his knowledge, Chiarella bought the target 
firms stock sold at a profit after the takeover bids 
were made publ1c. The Court reversed his conviction of 
violating Section lO(b) and Rule lOb-5 holding that 
Chiarella's use of the nonpublic information was not fraud 
because 3pe did not have a duty to disclose it before trading. The Court declined to rule on a theory, that had 
not been presented to the jury, that Chiarella violated the 
securities laws because he breachnd a duty that his employer had to the acquiring corporation. 
Chief Justice Burger, in dissent, asserted the theory 
that those, like Chiarella, who misappropriate material, 
information affirmative duty to disclose the 
1nformat1on before trad1ng. Such a theory, he opined, would 
not limit legitimate professional securities activities, but 
would prohibit Jhe use of information inaccessible to others 
by legal means. Justice Blackmun, in dissent, also asserted 
that "persons having access to confidential material 
information that is not legally available to others generally 
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are prohibited by Rule 10b-5 from engaging in schemes to 
exploit their structural informational advantage through 
trading in affected securities. To hold otherwise ... is to 
tolerate ft wide range of manipulative and deceitful 
behavior." 
In Dirks v. SEc38 the Supreme Court reiterated that "mere 
possession of nonpublic information does not give rise to a 
duty to disclose or abstain; only a specific relationship does 
that." 39 The Court also repeated its rejection of a parity of 
information rule which would require that traders refrain from 
trading if they are in possession of information unavailable 
to others.'0 The Court held that a tippee, one who receives 
information from an insider, has a duty to disclose 
from trading that derives from the duty of the 1ns1der · 
Thus, a tippee's duty not to trade on material, nonpublic 
information arises from an insider's duty to shareholders and 
attaches only when the t4\ppee knows or should know of the 
insider's breach of duty. 
What is clear from Chiarella and Dirks is that Rule 10b-5 
liability requires the breach of a duty by one who trades on 
material, nonpublic information; mere possession of material, 
nonpublic information by one who trades on that information in 
the securities markets is not enough for liability. The 
misappropriation theory of liability outlined by former Chief 
Justice Burger adheres to this general formula but does not 
require that breach be of a duty owed to buyers or sellers 
of securities. The br!ach may be of a d'ffY owed to an 
employer, 4 to a patient4 or to a relative, for example. 
Rule 10b-5 liability, according to this theory, attaches when 
people engage in securities transactions using material, 
nonpublic information they have misappropriated from any owner 
of that information in violation of a fiduciary duty or other 
relationship of trust and confidence. The misappropriation 
theory has adopted by the Second, Third, Seventh and 
Ninth Circuits. 7 It has not beyn definitively approved by 
the United States Supreme Court. 4 
In 1991 the United States Court of Appeals for the Seconfi 
Circuit, sitting in bane, decided United States v. Chestman, 
a case that illustrates the difficulties courts have in making 
sense of insider trading law as it currently exists. The 
occurrences that gave rise to the lawsuit began in November, 
1986 when Ira Waldbaum, the president and controlling 
shareholder of Waldbaum, Inc., a publicly traded company, 
negotiated the sale of the companYs to the Great Atlantic and 
Pacific Tea Company, Inc. (A&.P). 0 Mr. Waldbaum told his 
sister, Shirley Waldbaum Witkin, that he would tender her 
shares of Waldbaum stock as part of the sale so that she could 
avoid the fiomplications of tendering after the public 
announcement. warned her not to discuss the impending 
sale with anyone. On November 24 Mrs. Witkin gave her stock 
certificates to her brother. Later that day, Mrs. Witkin told 
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her daughter, Susan Loeb, in response to questions about her 
whereabouts that morning, that she had gone out to turn over 
her Waldbaum stock, to her brother. Mrs. Witkin also told her 
daughter that it was important that she not tell anyone except 
her husband because it could jeopardize the sale. Mrs. Loen 
told her husband, Keith, and warned him not to tell anyone. 
On November 26 Keith Loeb called Robert Chestman, a 
stockbroker and 55 financial advisor for Gruntal &. Co., a brokerage house. Loeb had been doing business with Chestman 
since 1982 and sfhestman knew that Loeb's wife was Ira 
Waldbaum's niece. According to Loeb's testimony, some time 
between 9 and 10:30 in the morning he told Chestman that he 
"'had some definite, some accurate information' that Waldbaum 
was being sold at a 'substfptially higher' price than the 
market value of the stock." Between 9:49 a.m. and 12:35 
p.m. that day Chestman purchased 11,000 shares of Waldbaum 
stock (including 3000 for himself, 1000 for Loeb, and 7000 for 
his other discretionary aliounts) at prices ranging from 
$24.65 to $26.00 per 51hare. Chestman denied having spoken 
to Loeb that morning. At the close of trading on November 
26 the tender offer was announced afid on November 27 the price 
of Waldbaum shares rose to $49.00. 
During an SEC investigation into the Waldbaum 
transactions, Loeb agreed to cooperate with the government, 
paid a fVfe, and disgorged the profits from his 1000 share 
purchase. Chestman denied any wrongdoing, claiming hiif! 
November 26th Waldbaum purchases were based on his research. 
Chestman was tried and convicted of, inter alia, ten counts of 
fraudulent trading in connection with a tender offer in 
of Rule 14e-3 frd ten counts of securities fraud in 
v1olat1on of Rule 10b-5. He was barred from the securities 
industry and turned over to the $235,125 in gains 
from the Waldbaum transactions. 4 He voluntarily began 
serving a two-year sentence in Allenwood Federal Prison Camp 
in June 1988 and was released in May 1989 after his conviction 
was reversed by fs three-judge panel of the Second Circuit 
Court of Appeals. 
After the SEC and federal prosecutors complained that the 
Chestman decision would hamper their efforts to prosecute 
other insider trading cases, the Second circuit agreed to the 
unusual measure of a full court review. The court heard 
in bane on 9, 1990 and handed down its 
op1n1on on October 7, 1991. The full court vacated the 
panel's decision on, inter alia, the Rule 14e-3 and Rule 10b-5 
questions and then affirmed the convictions for fraudulent 
trading in connection a tender offer, but reversed the 
Rule 10b-5 convictions. Judge Meskill, writing for the 
court, joined by four other judges and a fifth 
concurred. Five judges concurred in the Rule 14e-3 
from the reversals of the Rule 10b-5 
conv1ct1ons. One Judge concurred with the Rule 10b-5 
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reversals but dissented from the Rule 14e-3 affirmances. 71 
Chestman's Rule 10b-5 convictions had been based on (1) 
his purchase of Waldbaum stock for Keith Loeb "aiding and 
abetting Loeb's misappropriation of nonpublic information in 
breach of a duty Loeb owed to the Waldbaum family and to his 
wife Susan;" and, ( 2) his purchase of Waldbaum stock for 
himself and other clients from his being a tippee of 
the misappropriated informat1on. Based on the past Rule 10b-
5 jurisprudence of Chiarella, Dirks and the misappropriation 
theory, the full court concluded that Chestman could not be 
convicted of violating the Rule unless Keith Loeb had breached 
a duty owed to his wife and/or her family because of a 
fiduciary-like relationship of 3trust and confidence, and Chestman knew of Loeb's breach. 7 The court then concluded 
that kinship alone does not create the required relationship 
and that there was no evidence offered that Loeb had a 
fiduciary-like relationship with his wife or her family nor 
that he had expressly agreed to keep thfi 
information about the impending sale of the fam1ly bus1ness. 
Without Loeb's having breached a duty by disclosing the 
information about Waldbaum's to Chestman could not 
be liable for violating Rule 10b-5. 
Nevertheless, the Second Circuf6 t affirmed Chestman' s 
convictions for violating Rule 14e-3. The court was able to 
so affirm while reversing the Rule 10b-5 convictions because 
of the different language of the two Rules and their 
authorizing statutes, as supported by other evidence of 
Congressional intent. 
IV. Rule 14e-3 
Section 14(e) of the A.ct of 
which was enacted as part 1n 1968 and 
amended to its current vers1on 1n 1970, prov1des that 
[ i] t shall be unlawful for any person to make any 
untrue statement of a material fact or omit 
to state any material fact necessary in order to 
make the statements made, in the light of the 
circumstances under which they are made, not 
misleading, or to engage in any fraudulent, 
deceptive, or manipulative acts or practices, in 
connection with any tender offer or request or 
invitation for tenders, or any solicitation of 
security holders in opposition to or in favor of 
any such offer, request, or invitation. The 
Commission shall, for the purposes of this 
subsection, by rules and regulations define, and 
prescribe means reasonably designed to prevent, 
such acts and practices as fraudulent, 
deceptive, or manipulative. 
Section lO(b) and Section 14(e) are similar. The former 
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p:ohibits the use of manipulation or in connection 
w1th the purchase or sale of securities. The latter 
p:ohibi ts manipulatifin or or fr.au.d in connection 
w1th a tender offer. Both sect1ons spec1f1cally authorize 
the SEC to rules designed to prevent the prohibited 
activities. 
Faced with the difficulty of prosecuting insider trading 
cases after the Chiarella decision because of the duty 
requirement, the SEC promptly Rule 14e-3 pursuant 
to Section 14 (e) in October 1980. Many of the highly 
publicized insider trading cases involved buying shares of 
publicly traded companies just before tender offers for those 
shares were made public and then selling the sharfis at a 
substantial profit after the offer was announced. If 
Section 10(b) required the SEC to prove that such traders were 
breaching a duty in using the nonpublic information for 
personal gain or that they obtained their information from 
others who were breaching a duty for personal advantage, then 
the SEC would use Section 14 (e) instead to prosecute such 
insider trading cases. Contrary to the requirements the 
Supreme Court in Chiarella for a Section 10(b), 
Rule 10b-5 prosecut1on, Rule 14e-3 says that in a situation 
involving a tender offer, trading by persons in possession of 
nonpublic. which they know or should know 
was acqu1red from 1ns1ders constitutes prohibited conduct.8ij 
There is no specification that such trading is prohibited only 
if the insider is breaching a duty created by some 
relationship of trust and confidence and the trader knows of 
the breach. 
In Che¥fman, the Second Circuit addressed the validity of 
Rule 14e-3. The court emphasized the deference given to an 
administrative agency's regulation promulgated under an 
express Congressional delegation unless the regulation is 
"'arbitrarrs, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the 
'" The court then consid;fed whether Congress 
author1zed the SEC to enact Rule 14e-3. After analyzing the 
plain meaning of the words of Section 14(e), the legislative 
history of the Section and legislation, it 
concluded that Congress did so authorize. 
Section 14(e) directs the SEC to "define ... such acts 
and as are fraudulent, deceptive or 
manipulative." Congress' specific use of the term 
rather than "explain" or sigive examples of" or "enumerate" 
"identify and regulate", must mean that the SEC is being 
authorized to determine what acts and practices are fraudulent 
in the context of tender offer activity. In this connection, 
where the concern is maintaining securities markets that are 
fair, and appear to be fair, to the investing public, there is 
no purpose for requiring a breach of a fiduciary duty to any 
particular person or corporation as an element in a trading 
violation. The Congressional purpose in prohibiting insider 
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trading is to have the securities markets be fair so that the 
investing public will havf3 confidence. in .their integrity and 
keep investing in them. Thus, 1t 1s reasonable that 
Congress would have authorized the SEC to tinker with a 
definition of fraudulent acts and practices to make it suit 
the particular problem addressed by the Williams Act· The 
Second Circuit concluded that the wofids of the statute , 
particularly "define'', are dispositive. At the very 
that word makes it difficult to conclude that Rule 14e-3 1s 
" b1"trarx capricious, or manifestly contrary to the ar statute." 
In addition, Judge Meskill, writing for the court , noted 
support for his interpretation of Secthon 14(e) in. the 
legislative history of the 1970 amendment. He also po1nted 
to legislative activity since the promulgation of Rule 14e-3, 
specif?,cally the Insider Trading. and Sanctions .A':t of 1984 
(ITSA) and the Insider Trad1ng and Secur1t1es Fraud 
Enforcement Act ( ITSFEA), 98 as indicative of the Rule's 
validity. The legislative hist<;>ries ITSA and 
specifically mention Rule 14e-3 w1 th tac1 t approval. In 
fact the House Energy and Commerce Committee noted its 
that the SEC adopt a rule under ITSA similar to Rule 
14e-3, 101 The whole tone of these legislative histories 
evidences Congress' primary interest in strengthening 
enforcement inside tz:aders . by giving SEC broad 
authority and flex1ble laws w1th wh1ch to work. 
Nevertheless, critics have argued that Section 14(e) 
cannot be significantly distinguished from Section lO(b) and, 
therefore intenfretations of the latter also set precedent 
for the 0 The argument asserts that when the United 
States Supreme Court in Chiarella ruled that there can be no 
Rule lOb-5 violation by trading on material, nonpublic 
information absent a duty to the Court was creating law 
that also applies to Rule 14e-3. 
V. Reconciling Rule lOb-5 and Rule 14e-3 
Because the language of Sections 10(b) and 14(e) are not 
the same, it is not a stretch to conclude, as the Second 
Circuit did, that Chiarella's interpretation of the former 
does not necessarily set precedent for the latter. Section 
14(e) instructs ttbr SEC to "define . .. acts and practices as 
are frauduhrnt," a much more "compelling legislative 
delegation" than exists in Section lO(b). This strong, 
clear language combined with Congress' subsequent extended 
considerations of insider trading law and passage of ITSA and 
ITSFEA make it hard to dispute Congress' intent to eliminate 
insider trading and to allow great deal of 
flexibility in pursuing that obJect1ve. That intent 
supports the validity of Rule 14e-3. 
Unfortunately, acceptance of Rule 14e-3 as a valid 
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exercise of SEC authority, although making it easier for the 
SEC to prosecute insider trading cases, creates an incoherent 
body of insider trading law. If the Congressional purpose in 
insider trading laws is to maintain the integrity of 
markets so that outsiders will keep investing, then 
there 1s no reason to have liability attach with greater 
requirements under Rule lOb-5 than under Rule 14e-3 merely 
because the latter regulates trades in the context of tender 
offers . Outside investors may perceive themselves to be at an 
unfair disadvantage, and decline to invest in the securities 
markets, whenever they believe the markets are controlled by 
others who have access to any material , nonpublic information 
is through particular diligence: 
1nexpl1cable fortuity. Holding investors 
l1able for only when they have breached a duty 
or have used 1nformat1on obtained from someone else who 
a duty will permit many trades which threaten the 
1ntegr1 ty of the markets. For example, if the information 
Chestman received from Loeb was about a revolutionary new 
or marketing concept Waldbaum's was about to reveal, 
1nstead of about a pending tender offer, Rule 14e-3 would not 
been applicable and Rule lOb-5 would not have been 
v1olated under the Second Circuit's analysis of Loeb's absence 
of a duty. Nevertheless, outside investors would have been 
similarly disadvantaged because of their lack of access to 
Chestman obtained through his special relationship 
w1th Ke1th Loeb. The inconsistencies in the· interpretations 
of the two rules resulted in the Second Circuit's peculiar 
in Chestman: ( 1) Chestman was guilty of being an 
7ns1de because he traded on material , nonpublic 
1nformat1on concerning a pending tender offer that he knew or 
should have known came from an insider and that is a violation 
of Rule 14e-3; but, (2) Chestman was not guilty of fraud in 
connection with the purchase and sale of his Waldbaum stock 
because Keith Loeb, from whom Chestman obtained the material 
nonpublic information on which he traded did not breach 
fiduciary-type duty to his wife in disclosi1ng the information; 
therefore, there was no Rule lOb-5 
It is reasonable for both Rule lOb-5 and Rule 14e-3 in 
view of the Congressional purpose of achieving fairness'and 
the perception of fairness in the securities markets to 
.liability f.or trading on material, nonpu'blic 
1nformat1on .whenever 1t has been acquired in a way that is not 
legally ava1lable to the general investing public. The idea 
of unfair informational advantage serving as the basis for 
insider tfu,ding .violations has been circulating for more than 
a decade. Th1s theory responds to the basic Congressional 
purpose and to the psychology of investors. It the 
need for creating. artificial theories of liability, that do 
the a1m of protecting investors, in order to catch 
1ns1de traders who seem to elude standard interpretations of fraud. 
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The practical problem is, however, that a significant 
body of law, relying on common (yaw defini tiona of fraud, 
already exists for Rule 10b-5. 1 The Second Circuit's 
solution in Chestman was to interpret Rules 10b-5 and 14e-3 
differently relying on the differences in language in their 
authorizing statutes, but eschewing a discussion of pol icy 
reasons for the varying interpretations. 
VI. Conclusion 
It is time for Congress to define fraud, or to expressly 
empower the SEC to do so, in the context of all insider 
trading securities transactions. There is no policy reason 
for Sections 10(b) and 14(e) and the rules promulgated under 
them to be interpreted differently. There is no policy reason 
for the rules of common law fraud to govern securities law 
liability. There is no policy reason for insider trading to 
be illegal only when a duty is breached. The actual threat to 
public participation in security markets is the 
that insiders and their friends have access to Information 
that puts all others at a disadvantage when transacting 
purchases or sales in the securities markets. 
Therefore, liability under Rules 10b-5 and 14e-3 should 
attach when the method of acquisition of the information is 
wrongful. Achieving an informational advantage should be 
wrongful when it is the result of some special relationship 
and, therefore, is not lawfully available to the investing 
public. fn informational advantage achieved through mere good 
fortune 11 or extra diligence or superior intelligence could 
be traded on lawfully without prior disclosure. Congress' 
clear statement to this effect would help to achieve the goal 
of fair securities markets and would clarify for investors 
when disclosure before trading is required. 
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Transactions in securities on the basis of material, nonpubl ic 
information in the context of tender offers. 
(a) If any person has taken a substantial step or steps to 
commence, or has commenced, a tender offer (the "offering person " ), 
it shall constitute a fraudulent , deceptive or manipulative act or 
practice within the meaning of section 14(e) of the Act for any 
other person who is in possession of material information relating 
to such tender offer which information he knows or has reason to 
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deceptive or manipulative acts or practices within the meaning of 
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described in paragraph (d) ( 2) of this section to communicate 
material nonpublic information relating to a tender offer to any 
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violation of this section except that this paragraph shall not 
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the planning, financing, preparation or execution of such tender 
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acquired directly or indirectly from any of the above. 
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information obtained illegally or obtained legally and then 
illegally misappropriated for personal use. Phillips & Zutz, supra 
note 93, at 86-93; Barbara Bader Aldave, Misappropriation: A 
General Theory of Liability for Trading on Nonpublic Information, 
13 Hofstra L. Rev. 101, 122 (1984). 
Under a constructive insider theory one "who knowingly 
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fiduciary duty to disclose before trading." Dirks, 463 U.S. at 
656. See Phillips & Zutz, note 93, at 93-95. 
The breach of duty under each of these theories, however, is 
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CAN DEMAND NOTES REALLY 
BE DEMANDED? 
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Introduction 
Facts: 
Issue: 
Decision: 
ABC Bank lends $100,000 to B. Benny. B. Benny 
and delivers to the bank a negotiable 
note payable "on demand". ABC later 
demands payment. B. Benny refuses. ABC sues B. 
Benny for $100,000. B. Benny defends on the grounds 
that reasonable notice was required and not given. 
Whether a holder of a demand note can demand payment at any time? 
Maybe •. . . 
. A "demand note" is an instrument payable on demand and 
thos7 payable at sight or on presentation and those 
no t7me for payment is stated. 1 By its nature, and 
as reflected long accepted case law and in the u c c 
demand note entitles the holder to freely determine tlm: 
payment. In fa?t, such a note is actually due on the date 
I_Rade,, and has been suggested that its name is 
no actual prior demand is necessary to enforce payment. 
Questions concerning a holder's ability to require 
payment of f3 note at any time arise because of two 
apparently rules of law and because the intent 
of the not always clear. A two step analysis is 
call7d. for: (1) what is the effect of the applicable 
of the Code? and, (2) what is the intent of th e 
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